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Abstract: Sensors for monitoring electrical parameters over an entire electricity network infrastructure
play a fundamental role in protecting smart grids and improving the network’s energy efficiency.
When a short circuit takes place in a smart grid it has to be sensed as soon as possible to reduce its
fault duration along the network and to reduce damage to the electricity infrastructure as well as
personal injuries. Existing protection devices, which are used to sense the fault, range from classic
analog electro-mechanics relays to modern intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). However, both types
of devices have fixed adjustment settings (offline stage) and do not provide any coordination among
them under real-time operation. In this paper, a new smart sensor is developed that offers the
capability to update its adjustment settings during real-time operation, in coordination with the rest
of the smart sensors spread over the network. The proposed sensor and the coordinated protection
scheme were tested in a standard smart grid (IEEE 34-bus test system) under different short circuit
scenarios and renewable energy penetration. Results suggest that the short-circuit fault sensed by the
smart sensor is improved up to 80% and up to 64% compared with analog electromechanics relays
and IEDs, respectively.
Keywords: smart sensor; smart grid; reliability; adaptive protection; optimization
1. Introduction
In recent decades, power grids have been undergoing great changes led both by the adoption of
new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and also by a massive integration of renewable
energy sources. These modernized grids are commonly referred to as smart grids. The Smart Grids
European Technology Platform defines a smart grid as “an electricity network that can intelligently
integrate the actions of all users connected to it (generators, consumers, and those that do both) in
order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic, and secure electricity supply” [1]. Smart grids
can monitor the state of a grid in real time and use the information to operate the grid in a secure,
reliable, and stable way, with lower costs and improved energy efficiency [1–3]. In this context, sensors
and actuators (network breakers) are crucial players in smart grid management [4–6]. Employing
sensors for real-time monitoring allows one to deal with the power management of distributed energy
resources, such as distributed generators (DGs) [7] and electric vehicles [8], as well as to improve the
smart grid’s reliability [9].
Protection systems play an essential role in maintaining the promised power quality and reliability
of smart grids. Grid reliability can be defined as the ability of a power network to perform its intended
function of providing an adequate supply of electrical energy to customers efficiently with a reasonable
assurance of continuity and quality [10]. Traditional reliability metrics have focused mainly on duration
indices such as the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) or frequency indexes such as
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the System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), both measured on a yearly basis. SAIDI
and SAIFI consider the number of customers affected by the outage and have a direct relationship
with the performance of the protection devices. If the operation and tripping time of the protection
devices are not optimally coordinated, a greater number of customers can be affected by the power
interruption, consequently worsen the reliability indices. Some works have started to use new indices
such as the actuator tripping time [11] or switching time [12], which are related to the operation of
protection devices as shown in this paper.
The main objective of a protection system is to quickly detect an abnormal operation condition
and decide on the most appropriate action to ensure that the faulted zone is isolated and the rest of the
network works in a stable state. To detect a fault, such as a short-circuit, current monitoring devices are
used to measure the current flow through the network. This current measurement is compared with
a threshold current value or pick-up current of the protection devices to discriminate if the current
is due to a fault situation or not. The protection unit calculates the operation time (tripping time) of
the network actuators (breakers) according to their setting parameters. However, any malfunction in
protection devices can result in significant damage to the electricity network infrastructure, a loss of
electricity supply, and even endangerment of field crew.
Protection devices employed in distribution networks have evolved over time, from analog
electromechanical relays, with reduced detection capabilities, to intelligent electronic devices (IEDs)
that are able to transform the analog data gathered by current and voltage transducers into digital data
and to provide adaptive protection functionalities remotely [13]. It must be noted that because of the
limited processing capacity of IEDs, the updated protection setting parameters must be calculated by
an external control center (centralized system) and communicated to the individual IEDs depending
on the fault situation [13].
Distributed generators (DGs) such as photovoltaic installations and wind turbines are considered
key actors for enabling the implementation of smart grids [14]. However, the protection of smart grids
with DGs faces new challenges because of the stochastic behavior of renewable energy sources and
their significant contribution to short-circuit currents when a fault is taking place. Until a few decades
ago, a protection device’s settings were usually adjusted offline for the dominant or the most frequent
topology of the power grid, taking into consideration the maximum load demand and the fixed
energy production from the DG [15,16]. Nevertheless, the increasing integration of DG sources into
distribution networks has revealed that classical protection schemes, using analog electromechanical
relays, are not suitable for protecting smart grids in a safe and reliable way under high renewable
energy penetration [17].
Some works in the literature have proposed the use of protection schemes intended for dealing
with the distinctive features of smart grids. In [18] and [19], data gathered by several IEDs were used
to improve the network fault location with the presence of DGs. In other cases, IEDs were provided
with directional protection functionality where the adaptive protection settings were established by
a control centre which communicated to the IEDs their setting parameters [20].
The protection schemes of smart grids must deal with all the changes in the distribution networks
(such as topology and DG variability); therefore, maintaining fixed protection settings of protection
devices is no longer valid [21]. To improve a smart grid’s reliability, new protection devices have to be
designed with the following characteristics:
• They have to offer the ability to measure, detect, and automatically adapt their protection settings
for each fault situation.
• These protection devices should be able to communicate both between one another and also
with the actuators (network breakers) to share optimal settings as well as control actions in
a decentralized architecture.
• Moreover, the design of new relay-based smart sensors, in which the coordination schemes could
run inside each smart sensor, will help to speed up the fault detection and isolation process.
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This paper presents a new relay-based smart sensor that is able to locally measure, detect,
and isolate a short circuit (fault) in the minimum time possible. Furthermore, the smart sensor is
able to update, locally, its setting parameters in real-time operation. Once a short circuit is detected,
an adaptive protection scheme (APS) running inside each smart sensor optimizes its setting parameters
in communication with the rest of the coordinated sensors that detect the fault. The optimal setting
parameters are selected to minimize the opening duration time of the network breaker closest to
the fault.
The smart sensors calculate the opening duration time of the network breakers, according to the
fault measurements and their optimal settings, and they send those breakers the opening activation
order. The information sharing among the coordinated smart sensors and the network breakers is
based on the IEC 61850 Standard [22] using GOOSE messages.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold:
• A smart sensor is proposed that is able to locally calculate and update its parameters by means of
an extended current-time search-space for each fault situation. Firstly, it should be noted that
traditional protection devices use only fixed time-current curves according to [23] and secondly,
the existing adaptive protection devices select one of the available time-current curves [23] in each
fault condition. The smart sensor proposed in this paper is the only sensor capable of optimizing,
directly, its protection setting parameters using the whole search-space made available by the
protection instead of using the pre-defined time-current curves of the standard [23].
• A peer-to-peer communication is performed between coordinated sensors, based on the IEC
61850 [22] to optimize the operation time of the coordinated sensors.
It must be pointed out that, to the authors’ knowledge, none of these aspects have been addressed
in the scientific literature.
2. Protection of Power Networks
The primary purpose of an electrical network is to efficiently deliver reliable electricity to
consumers. Protection systems are of utmost importance in the reliability of electrical networks, since
they are directly linked to interruptions in the power supply affecting the grid reliability (SAIFI, SAIDI).
During network disturbances, such as short circuits or faults, protective devices used for the protection
of the electrical network must detect the fault and activate the opening of the networks’ breakers
in order to isolate the faulted zone. The correct intervention of the protective devices minimizes
the outage time of the grid and reduces the effect of the fault currents on the network equipment.
The fault-clearing process is based on the selectivity protection property [24], which means that only
the protective devices that detect the fault activate the opening of the corresponding network breaker
according to their detection setting parameters.
Analog electromechanical relays are characterized by inverse time-current curves defined by the
IEC 60255-151 [23]. Electromechanical relays operate in a time that is inversely proportional to the








where Tr represents the operating time of the electromechanical relays, Isc is the short-circuit current,
Ipickup is the current threshold value, and the time-dial setting (TDS) defines the time delay between the
fault detection and the action of the corresponding breaker. The parameters α and n, listed in Table 1,
are defined in the IEC 60255-151 standard [23] for different time-current relay characteristics (inverse,
very inverse, extremely inverse).
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Table 1. Parameters for different relay characteristics according to the IEC 60255-151 standard.
Time-Current Curve Type Settings
Inverse α = 0.14; n = 0.02
Very inverse α = 13.5; n = 1
Extremely inverse α = 80; n = 2
To obtain a correct actuation of the protection equipment, power networks are subdivided into
protection zones. Protection devices (relays) are responsible for detecting any fault that occurs in
an assigned area, known as the primary protection zone. Moreover, they may properly provide backup
protection to an area outside their primary zone (downstream). This means that each zone is protected
by two relays: a primary relay (PR) and a backup relay (BR). The PR operates under short circuits
inside its primary protection, and the breaker closest to the fault is the one that opens first, whereas the
BR operates only if the PR fails to isolate the fault after a time delay. Each zone is overlapped by its
adjacent zone to avoid unprotected (blind) areas. This overlapping is accomplished according to the
location of the protection equipment electromechanical relays and network breakers.
Electrical distribution networks typically consist of a secondary substation and a main feeder
with lateral branches. In Figure 1, a radial distribution network, consisting of a secondary substation,
a main feeder, three bus bars, and three loads, is used as an example to illustrate these principles.
The placement of the three protective devices, namely, Relay 1, Relay 2, and Relay 3, delimits the three
zones of protection; Zone 3 is protected by Relay 3 as its PR and by Relay 2 as its BR. Similarly, Relay 2
and Relay 1 are the PR and the BR, respectively, for Zone 2. Finally, Zone 1 has only Relay 1 which it is
the PR. If a fault occurs in Zone 3 but the local PR of that zone (Relay 3) and the BR (Relay 2) fail to
operate, then Relay 1 should operate to isolate the fault that occurred downstream of its protection
zone. Figure 1 illustrates the typical relays’ operation curves and coordination time between their
respective PRs and BRs, for a fault in Zone 2.
Sensors 2020, 20, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 23 
 
Extremely inverse α = 80; n = 2 
To obtain a correct actuation of the protection equipment, power networks are subdivided into 
protection zones. Protection devices (relays) are responsible for detecting any fault that occurs in an 
assigned area, known as the primary protection zone. Moreover, they may properly provide backup 
protection to an area outside their primary zone (downstream). This means that each zone is 
protected by two relays: a primary relay (PR) and a backup relay (BR). The PR operates under short 
circuits inside its primary protection, and the breaker closest to the fault is the one that opens first, 
whereas the BR operates only if the PR fails to isolate the fault after a time delay. Each zone is 
overlapped by its adjacent zone to avoid unprotected (blind) areas. This overlapping is accomplished 
according to the location of the protection equipment electromechanical relays and network breakers. 
Electrical distribution networks typically consist of a secondary substation and a main feeder 
with lateral branches. In Figure 1, a radial distribution network, consisting of a secondary substation, 
a main feeder, three bus bars, and three loads, is used as an example to illustrate these principles. The 
placement of the three protective devices, namely, Relay 1, Relay 2, and Relay 3, delimits the three 
zones of protection; Zone 3 is protected by Relay 3 as its PR and by Relay 2 as its BR. Similarly, Relay 
2 and Relay 1 are the PR and the BR, respectively, for Zone 2. Finally, Zone 1 has only Relay 1 which 
it is the PR. If a fault occurs in Zone 3 but the local PR of that zone (Relay 3) and the BR (Relay 2) fail 
to operate, then Relay 1 should operate to isolate the fault that occurred downstream of its protection 
zone. Figure 1 illustrates the typical relays’ operation curves and coordination time between their 
respective PRs and BRs, for a fault in Zone 2. 
 
Figure 1. Typical current-time curves of a distribution feeder. 
2.1 Protection Challenges in Smart Grids 
Smart grids are characterized by a high penetration of renewable energy sources, known as DGs, 
spread over a network. DG units are characterized by a bidirectional power flow from the DG to the 
grid. Depending on both the fault and the DG location, the operation of the protection devices can be 
affected.  
Assume a radial distribution network with two feeders connected to the secondary substation 
(bus 1), similar to the one depicted in Figure 2. The distribution network has a DG unit, consisting of 
a photovoltaic (PV) farm, connected at Bus 2 and two customers located at Bus 3 and Bus 4. For 
protecting the grid, three relays are installed at Buses 1, 2, and 3 where Relay 1 is considered to be 
bidirectional.  
PV inverters are equipped with overcurrent protection that limits the inverter output current up 
to 1.3 of the rated current [25]. Depending on the inverter technology and the voltage drop at the PV 
location, they are required to remain connected to the grid providing LVRT capabilities during a 
Figure 1. Typical current-time curves of a distribution feeder.
Protection Challenges in Smart Grids
S art grids are characterized by a high penetration of renewable energy sources, known as DGs,
spread over a net ork. DG units are characterized by a bidirectional power flo fro the to the
grid. Depending on both the fault and the DG location, the operation of the protection devices can
be affected.
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Assume a radial distribution network with two feeders connected to the secondary substation
(bus 1), similar to the one depicted in Figure 2. The distribution network has a DG unit, consisting
of a photovoltaic (PV) farm, connected at Bus 2 and two customers located at Bus 3 and Bus 4.
For protecting the grid, three relays are installed at Buses 1, 2, and 3 where Relay 1 is considered to
be bidirectional.
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to 1.3 of he rated current [25]. Depending on the inverter technology and the voltage drop at th PV
location, they are required to remain connected to the grid providing LVRT capabilities during a period
of tim rangi g from 20 ms to 200 ms [26–28]. Moreover, th IEEE Std 1547-2018 [26] states that the
clearing time of protection DG unit has to be s lect d from 0.16 s to 20 s depending on the voltage
level at th DG connection point.
In this case, if a fault occurs in Zone 3, two different situ tions ca unfold:
• If there are clouds or an absence of sunlight, then the net power injected by the PV generators
into the grid is zero (Figure 2a). In this situation, the short-circuit current flows from the grid to
the fault, and only Relay 3 is able to detect the fault and consequently isolate the faulted zone
(Zone 3).
• In the case of large PV generators and diurnal conditions (Figure 2b), if a fault takes place in Zone
3 they have to remain connected to the gri up to 20 s after the short circuit feeding the fault fr m
the DG to the grid. In this case, not only does Relay 3 detect the fault, but Relay 1 also detects
a fault current contribution from the DG. In this situation, the current seen by the protective Relay
1 could exceed its threshold current (because of the short-circuit contribution from the large size
PV generators) and may produce the unnecessary tripping of the healthy feeder before Relay 3
operates to clear the fault. This situation is called sympathetic tripping [29–31]. The sympathetic
tripping effect does not happen for small PV generators because for low penetration levels,
the effective limitation of the inverter current to below 1.3 times the rated current cannot provoke
the tripping of Relay 1.
Given the previous issue, DG connection to smart grids causes a reverse power flow from the DG
that could lead to the untimely action of the protection device, which is a selectivity problem. Therefore,
traditional protection coordination schemes, with fixed setting parameters, become ineffective in
smart grids with DGs. It is thus necessary to develop new protection schemes that are able to adapt
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the setting parameters of the protective devices in relation to the intermittent share of distributed
generation [32,33].
Several approaches exist in the scientific literature for addressing the protection coordination issue
in distribution networks with DGs. The authors in [34] proposed the use of dual setting directional
relays based on current fault direction for directional protective devices (that is, IEDs) equipped with
different time or current characteristic curves. Although protection settings are established using
a nonlinear optimization function, they consider only the installed power of DGs, and the protection
settings consequently remain fixed and are independent of any variation in generation or demand in
real time. The work in [16] proposes a nonlinear optimization method for directional protective devices
that are intended for protection planning purposes in future scenarios of DG growth. Although this
methodology includes the requirement of protection setting adjustments for any new DG installation,
it does not consider any adaptive, real-time adjustment of protection for variable grid topology, load or
generation conditions.
The previously mentioned protection schemes have one main limitation: the protection
coordination problem considers a static network; that is, the adjustment of protective devices is
achieved considering the amount of DG installed capacity in a predetermined network with a fixed
demand. Therefore, for real-time variation in load demand or generation, the proposed schemes
will only be valid for the conditions of generation, demand, and network topology for which the
protective devices have been adjusted [15]. The evolution suffered by the electric power networks,
as well as the growing concern about the improvement of their reliability, necessitates the development
of new protection schemes to ameliorate the reaction time of protective devices to follow demand and
generation variability [15,16,35,36].
3. Smart Sensors for Smart Grid Protection
3.1. Relay-Based Smart Sensor Architecture
In smart grids, several parameters must be measured, such as voltage, current, temperature,
and phase, to be able to detect any parameter fluctuation in near real time and manage the corrective
actions to assure grid reliability under fault conditions. Furthermore, the measured data must be
readable by intelligent devices and contain a timestamp as well as the sensor location to facilitate
decision support in smart grid operation [37].
The relay-based smart sensor proposed in this paper is a single device composed of several
modules (Figure 3):
• Data acquisition module. This module is in charge of monitoring and measuring the analogue signal
in real time by means of the electricity transducers installed in the network.
• Data conditioning. In this module, the analogue electrical signal is conditioned and converted into
a digital signal. After the sampling stage, the root mean square (RMS) value of the sampled signal
is calculated and used to obtain the fundamental component of the measured signal.
• Microprocessor unit (MPU). This module is responsible for processing the digital signal in order to
detect and activate the network breaker to isolate the faulted zone. This is the core of the sensor
in which the smart-sensor settings are updated depending on the network conditions and fault
situation. Inside the MPU, the optimization algorithm (the APS) is responsible for selecting the
optimal setting parameters that minimize the operation time of the PR and BR of the faulted
zone. When a fault occurs, only the PR of the faulted zone executes the APS in the MPU to
determine the optimal setting parameters of the primary and backup smart sensors. Moreover,
the MPU algorithms are able to transform a physical measurement in an electric signal that could
be processed, stored, and communicated to other devices through a bidirectional communication
channel [1,37]. Finally, digital measured data could be stored internally on the device for future
local or remote treatment.
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• Synchronization module. An internal clock allows for the synchronization of the acquired digital
data with an external time reference that could be shared with other devices, such as global
positioning systems (GPS). Using measurement synchronization helps to improve the quality
and accuracy of the measurement data. In smart grids, measurement synchronization is of great
importance for operational and protection issues.
• Communication module. The communication module is responsible for the peer-to-peer
communication between the smart sensors. For communication issues, smart sensors use the
IEC 61850 standard [22]. When a fault takes place, the primary smart sensor communicates the
optimal setting parameters to the backup smart sensor and activates the opening of the circuit
breaker by GOOSE messages.
• Additional module for metadata sensor storage. This module allows the device to perform
supplementary tasks related to the following: smart-sensor description and identification capability
(self-description and self-identification); quality control of the work achieved by the smart sensor;
and operation error reporting (self-diagnostics, self-testing and self-validation).
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The operation carried out by the sensor is the follo ing:
A s art sensor “ith” measures the current seen by the sensor and calculates its RMS value.
This RMS value is processed into the “ith”smart sensor’s MPU where it is co pared with the Ipickup
threshold value of the “ith” smart sensor. If the measured current value is higher than its Ipickup value
it means that a fault has been sensed by the smart sensor “ith”. Consequently, the communication
module of the smart sensor “ith” sends a GOOSE message to the downstream smart sensor “ith+1”
which has to discriminate, itself, if the current seen by the sensor “ith+1” corresponds to a fault or not.
If the sensor “ith+1” detects a fault it sends a goose message to the upstream sensor “ith” and to the
downstream sensor “ith+2”. The peer-to-peer communication between consecutives sensors continues
until it reaches the last smart sensor that does not sense any fault so that the faulted zone is identified.
Once the faulted zone has been identified, the last two smart sensors that sensed the fault
are identified as primary and backup sensors, respectively. The MPU of the primary smart sensor
determines the optimal setting parameters of both smart sensors responsible for protecting the faulted
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zone, and the optimal setting parameters for the backup smart sensor are sent via GOOSE messages
through the communication module.
Afterwards, the primary sensor sends the opening order to the corresponding breaker via GOOSE
messages by means of the communication module. If the primary sensor fails, the backup relay sends
the opening order to the breaker according to its activation time value.
The smart sensor proposed in this paper offers added value to utilities, because of the telemetry
functionality as well as remote operation and corrective action or predictive decision-making process,
thereby improving grid efficiency and integrating new sensor technologies.
The novelty of the smart sensor lies in the peer-to-peer communication capacity between the
smart sensors of a faulted zone (the PR and BR) to isolate the fault and to establish a stable operation
condition. The smart-sensor APS takes into account different smart grid operation conditions regarding
DG integration and network topology. The APS also optimizes the primary and backup protection
setting parameters to minimize the tripping time of the actuators (breakers) and isolate the faulted zone
as quickly as possible. For that purpose, the APS employs three setting parameters (α, n, and TDS)
that extend the operation area of the smart sensor beyond the standard curves defined by the IEC
60255-151 standard [23].
In the smart sensors, the IEC 61850 standard has been implemented so that the primary smart
sensor (the PR) is able to communicate the adaptive protection setting parameters to the backup smart
sensor (the BR) via GOOSE messages.
The incorporation of these smart sensors into smart grid protection schemes allows for the
enhancement of the network operation thanks to the real-time actions. It has to be highlighted that
the smart sensor can be combined with other measurement devices such as phase measurement
units (PMUs). PMUs have been used to monitor long transmission lines since 1970 to improve the
network observability or to provide synchronized measurements to transmission line protection
devices (differential protection, distance protection, frequency protection) [38,39]. PMUs can acquire
fast sampling rate measurements which are sent to a central phase data concentrator to be processed,
afterwards, by the control or protection network algorithms. They have been applied extensively in
long transmission networks. However, their application to short-line distribution networks is still very
limited. There is a study [40] that proposes the integration of PMUs with smart meters in distribution
networks to improve the metering infrastructure.
If PMUs were deployed in distribution networks as detailed in this paper, the proposed smart
sensor can use, directly, the measurements provided by the installed PMUs. In this case, the PMU’s
measurements will enter directly to the MPU where all the acquired measurements, provided by the
conventional transducers and PMUs, will be processed to detect and activate the network breaker to
isolate the faulted zone.
3.2. Relay-Based Smart Sensor Optimization Approach
The objective of the smart-sensor protection scheme is to minimize the operating time of the
coordinated smart sensors (the PR and BR) while maintaining selectivity and enabling the isolation of
the faulted zone.
As previously mentioned, classical analog electromechanical relays have proven to be inefficient
when applied in networks with DGs [41]. To solve the problems of classical coordination, the authors
in [42] employed IEDs with linear optimization techniques to adapt the protections settings using
a centralized scheme. In this case, a constant ratio (Isc/Ipickup) was considered, and a single variable in
the optimization process was optimized (TDS). However, the results in [43] obtained from the linear
optimization process using a single variable were not suitable because they do not consider all the
network operating conditions (Figure 4a). To overcome these limitations, the protection coordination
problem has been solved using IEDs with nonlinear optimization algorithms, in which TDS and the
ratio (Isc/Ipickup) were the decision variables [43]. A limitation of this approach is that it uses only the
predefined time–current characteristic curves included in the IEC standard [23].
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The proposed smart-sensor coordination approach is formulated as a nonlinear multivariable
mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) optimization problem. Relay-based smart-sensor
parameters α, n, and TDS are optimized by means of a genetic algorithm (GA) using three degrees of
freedom in the coordination process. Moreover, the pickup currents are updated whenever a change in
the distribution network is detected according to [44].
The advantage of optimizing three variables instead of two [45,46] is that the operating area of the
smart sensor is expanded in the available search space, as illustrated in Figure 4b; this overcomes the
restrictions imposed by the predefined time–current curves in [23]. This aspect has not been addressed
before in the scientific literature and is of utmost relevance to improve the reliability of the smart grid.
Note that for real-time operation, where only two relay-based smart sensors must be coordinated
for each zone, the optimization of three degrees of freedom for each smart sensor does not require
a relevant computational burden.
3.3. Rel y-Base Smart Sensor Communication
A crucial aspect in smart grids is the communication between devices connected to the network.
Several standards have emerged as alternatives to create the backbone and communications network
for smart grids. The most highlighted outcome of this standardization initiative is the IEC 61850
standard because of its ability to provide standard object-oriented modeling that could be mapped to
various protocols. The IEC 61850 [22] is an international standard for the automation of measurement,
control, and protection of secondary substations in distribution networks. It establishes a data model
and a communication architecture that enable the interoperability of distribution networks by turning
physical devices into logical devices.
GOOSE messages entail a fast communication channel to share events-related information between
multiple smart grid devices mapped by the IEC 61850, mainly those related to the critical information of
smart grids. Furthermore, GOOSE messaging allows for the exchange of both digital and analogue data
between peer-to-peer devices with an average processing rate of 12 ms. Peer-to-peer communication
in the IEC 61850 environment introduces the concept of publisher and subscriber devices regarding the
information exchange. When a device publishes a GOOSE message, only subscriber devices receive it
and react according to their functionality in the distribution network.
In this paper, IEC 61850 and GOOSE messaging are used with the aim of sharing the optimal
protection setting parameters between the PR and BR of a faulted zone and sharing the tripping signal
to the network breaker to isolate the fault. For that purpose, the primary smart sensor runs the APS and
publishes the optimal protection setting parameters to the BR of the faulted zone and the associated
tripping time of the network breaker to the primary smart relay. Although the GOOSE messaging
information is published for all devices connected to the distribution network, only subscriber devices
(backup smart sensor and primary network breaker) receive it.
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Figure 5 illustrates the communication via GOOSE messages among the different elements
involved in the optimal coordination of the smart sensors of a faulted zone. When a fault occurs in the
smart grid, the APS—hosted in the MPU of the primary smart sensors of the faulted zone—determines
the optimal setting parameters of the pair of smart sensors to be coordinated. The adjustment
parameters of the backup smart sensor are then sent by publishing a GOOSE message that is received
only by the backup smart sensor of the faulted zone. Once the parameters (α, n, and TDS) of the
primary and backup smart sensors have been updated according to the faulted operation condition,
smart sensors determine the actuators’ activation time (trp and trb) and send a GOOSE message with
the trip request to the respective network breaker.Sensors 2020, 20, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 23 
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4. Smart-Sensor Adaptive Protection Co rdination Sche e ( PS)
4.1. Objective Function
To determine the opening orders of network breakers, the relay-based s art sensors’ operating
time (Tr) is computed as a function of TDS and parameters α and n using Equation (2). ese
parameters are updated according to each situation f grid topology (“t”), fault type (“c”), faulted zone
(“ ”)b and DG penetration level (“d”) (3).
Tr_tczd = f (TDSr_tczd, αr_tczd, nr_tczd) (2)







The coordination of relay-based smart sensors is formulated as an MINLP optimization problem;
see Equation (4):
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m∑
i=1





Sensors 2020, 20, 2187 11 of 23
• Wi and W j are the weights assigned to the activation times of the primary smart sensors rp and
the backup smart sensors rb;
• Trp_tcdz is the activation time of the primary smart sensor rp; and
• ∆Trp,rb_tcdz is the coordination time between the primary smart sensor rp and the backup smart
sensor rb, (5), (6).
Trp_tcdz − Trb_tcdz ≥ CTIrp,rb (5)














The proposed optimization problem is subjected to the following constraints:
4.2.1. Coordination Criterion
The protection coordination criterion establishes the minimum time elapsed between the operation
of the primary and the backup protection, known as the coordination time interval (CTI). To ensure the
correct coordination between the primary and backup smart sensors, the coordination time must be
greater than the minimum established time (7):
CTIrp,rbmin ≤ CTIrp,rb (7)
4.2.2. Operation Time Limits
The time that a smart sensor takes to detect a fault produced in its zone of influence and activate
the opening of the breaker must be bounded. Equation (8) determines the operating time limits of the
relay-based smart sensor:
tr,max ≤ tr_tcdz ≤ tr,min (8)
where tr,min and tr,max are the minimum and the maximum response times of the smart sensor r,
respectively, for a fault in its operation area n.
4.2.3. Time-Dial Setting (TDS) Limits
The operating time of the smart sensor is directly proportional to the TDS. Therefore, the smart
sensor’s operating time is restricted by the limit values of the TDS (9).
TDSr,max ≤ TDSr_tcdz ≤ TDSr,min (9)
where TDSr,min and TDSr,max are the minimum and the maximum TDS values for the smart sensor
r, respectively.
4.2.4. Plug Setting Multiplier (PSM) Limits
The plug setting multiplier (PSM) is the ratio of the fault current (Isc) in the smart sensor to its
pickup current (Ipickup). The limits established for the PSM are expressed in (10).
PSMr,max ≤ PSMr ≤ PSMr,min (10)
where PSMr,min and PSMr,max are the minimum and the maximum PSM values for the smart sensor
r, respectively.
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4.2.5. Relay-Based Smart Sensor’s Operating Characteristics
To extend the search space of the relay-based smart sensor, the smart sensor parameters α and n
are optimized considering the maximum and the minimum values established by [23] for each smart
sensor as expressed in (11) and (12), respectively:
αr,min ≤ αr_tcn ≤ αr,max (11)
nr,min ≤ nn_tcn ≤ nn,max (12)
To solve the convex problem, an MINLP method is employed and solved by a GA.
After the execution of the APS in the primary smart sensors of the faulted zone, the optimal
characteristic parameters of these smart sensors are updated (αrp, nrp, and TDSrp), and the ones
corresponding to the BR are sent via GOOSE messages (αrb, nrb, and TDSrb). Once the setting
parameters are updated in the primary and secondary smart sensors, the activation time of both
relay-based smart sensors is computed. The trip signal of the network breaker associated with the
primary smart sensor is sent immediately via GOOSE messages. However, if the fault is not isolated
by the primary smart sensor, then the trip signal computed by the backup smart sensor is sent to
its actuator.
4.3. Genetic Algorithm Process
The programming of the relay-based smart-sensor optimization coordination was carried out by
means of a GA. Genetic algorithms belong to the meta-heuristic algorithms which have proven to be
suitable for global search optimization techniques, dealing with linear and nonlinear, continuous or
discontinuous as well as convex problems [47–50]. GA is a multipoint and population-based search
methodology, so that the possibility of finding a global optimum solution is higher than that of other
optimization methods, such as single-point search methodology, due to the possibility to explore the
search space in different directions simultaneously [51,52].
Among other heuristic algorithms, Tabu search and Ant Colony are time-consuming methods;
by contrast, GA computes rapidly [53]. Simulated annealing and neural networks present slow
convergence and could be trapped in a local minimum, while GA has the ability to perform a global
search [53].
The genetic algorithm pseudocode is presented in Figure 6. The steps of the GA programming are
described below.
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4.3.1. Encoding Solutions (Step 1) 
The first step is the determination of the method for coding the potential solutions of the 
problem, namely, defining the encoding of the chromosomes used in the GA. 
The variables to be encoded are α, n, and TDS. These three variables used in the smart-sensor 
coordination process are considered integer numbers. Therefore, the chromosome used by the GA is 
composed of integer variables and its size depends on the number of smart sensors that have to be 
simultaneously coordinated. For each relay-based smart sensor (𝑁 ) to coordinate in the power 
network, three genes (2 ∗ 𝑁 ) are needed, representing the variables α, n, and TDS of each relay-based 
smart sensor. The size of the chromosomes used will thus follow the expression 3 ∗ 𝑁 . Table 2 
displays the chromosome structure used in the GA. 
4.3.2. Initial Population (Step 2) 
The initial population of the problem is generated by a random procedure in which the variables’ 
constraints are taken into account: the limit values of α, n, and TDS. 
The population size should be large enough to guarantee an optimal exploration of the solution 
space. 
i r . s c .
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4.3.1. Encoding Solutions (Step 1)
The first step is the determination of the method for coding the potential solutions of the problem,
namely, defining the encoding of the chromosomes used in the GA.
The variables to be encoded are α, n, and TDS. These three variables used in the smart-sensor
coordination process are considered integer numbers. Therefore, the chromosome used by the GA
is composed of integer variables and its size depends on the number of smart sensors that have to
be simultaneously coordinated. For each relay-based smart sensor (Ns) to coordinate in the power
network, three genes (2 ∗NS) are needed, representing the variables α, n, and TDS of each relay-based
smart sensor. The size of the chromosomes used will thus follow the expression 3 ∗Ns. Table 2 displays
the chromosome structure used in the GA.
Table 2. GA chromosome structure.
Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3 ... Gen (3 * NS-2) Gen 3 * (NS-1) Gen (3 * NS)
αR1 nR1 TDSR1 . . . αRn nRn TDSRn
4.3.2. Initial Population (Step 2)
The initial population of the problem is generated by a random procedure in which the variables’
constraints are taken into account: the limit values of α, n, and TDS.
The population size should be large enough to guarantee an optimal exploration of the
solution space.
4.3.3. Genetic Operators (Steps 3 to 9)
From this step (Step 3), and until the stop criteria are met, a loop begins whose objective
is to generate a new population, Pgeneration+1, by applying genetic operators to the current
population, Pgeneration.
Once the objective function has been evaluated (F (y), Step 4), and as long as the stop criteria are
not met, the genetic operators are applied to create the next study population by first selecting (Step 5)
the individuals that will constitute the parents in the reproductive process. The GA uses the roulette
selection method to prioritize solutions that yield better aptitude values over those obtaining worse
aptitude values. This method allows the best search areas to be exploited.
After the population of parents is obtained, the crossing is carried out (Step 6). Among all the
techniques related to this process, the one chosen here is the single point crossing technique, since the
size of the chromosomes used is small. Moreover, the utilization of other techniques could break the
chain of the population considerably, leading to a loss of relevant information about the improved
search areas. For the crossing probability, a value of 0.8 has been established (i.e., applying a crossing
over 80% of the population).
The next step in the generation process of a new population is the application of the mutation
operator (Step 7). The objective of this operator is to introduce diversity in the population or rescue
information that may have been lost in the selection and crossing processes. Since the probability of
crossover is high, a mutation probability (pm = 0.1%) has been selected that allows for the expansion
of the exploratory capacity of the algorithm.
Finally, it is necessary to introduce children into the existing population to generate the population
employed in the following iterative process. The option of replacement (Step 8) of the parents with the
children has been chosen, based on the theory of evolution, according to which the children inherit the
best properties of the parents in terms of adaptation to the environment.
From the intermediate population, composed of children resulting from the crossing and mutation
processes and along with the population of the current generation, a new population corresponding to
the next generation, Pgeneration+1, is obtained.
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4.3.4. Stopping Criteria
Two stop criteria have been defined:
• Tolerance of solutions: of the suitable values obtained by the best solution of two consecutive
generations, the minimum tolerance value considered is 10−6.
• Maximum number of generations: a maximum number of 100 generations has been chosen.
In this paper, the number of smart sensors to coordinate simultaneously is two (Ns = 2) for each
fault situation (PR, BR). The genetic algorithm is in charge of optimizing the tripping time of two
consecutive relays (PR and BR) once the fault has been detected. Consequently, it can be easily scaled
up to large network because, independently of the network size, the genetic algorithm optimizes only
the parameters for the primary and backup relay where the fault has been detected.
5. Case studies
5.1. Power Network Description
The proposed smart-sensor coordination scheme was implemented in a smart grid based on the
topology of the IEEE 34-Node Test Feeder [54], as illustrated in Figure 7. The network consists of
the following:
• a secondary substation (69 kV/24.9 kV);
• a main feeder and five laterals;
• two photovoltaic PV farms at Nodes 20 (DG20) and 22 (DG22) with a rated power of 12 MW;
• nineteen customers with a nominal load demand of 12 MW; and
• seven relay-based smart sensors (S_1 to S_7) at Nodes 1, 4, 8, 12, 14, and 16 of the main feeder and
at Node 26 of Lateral 5.
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Figure 7. Modified IEEE 34-Node Test Feeder.
The smart sensors’ location sectionalizes the main feeder of the studied smart grid into seven
protection zones (Table 3). The lengths of the medium voltage power lines range from 85.3 m to
14.7 km [54]. Smart sensors are spread along the main feeder with a separation distance ranging from
2.4 km (zone 5) to 17.7 km (zone 3). Data regarding the distribution power network are provided in
references [44,54]. Each relay-based smart sensor hosts the APS in its MPU in order to determine the
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optimal setting parameters when a fault is detected in its primary protective zone and to calculate the
activation time of network breakers.
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Scenario B was chosen to demonstrate the application of the protective smart protection scheme.
In this scenario (Table 4), a three-phase fault appears at the main feeder between buses 6 and 7, inside
Protection Zone 2. The PR and BR of this protection zone correspond to Smart Sensor 2 (S_2) and Smart
Sensor 1 (S_1), respectively. In Scenario B, the only available DG is the PV-generation unit connected
at bus 22 (DG22), with a penetration level of 50%, which corresponds to 4.94 MW. The total power
network demand at the fault instant is 80% of the substation transformer capacity, which is 9.88 MW.
The operation of the smart-sensor coordination is explained as follows:
• Once the fault is detected, the PR-based smart sensor (S_2) runs the APS hosted in its MPU in
order to determine the optimal setting parameters of both S_2 and S_1 for the optimal isolation of
the faulted zone (Z2). The APS employs the extended area of the relay-based smart sensors to
be coordinated, delimited by the imposed limits in (11) and (12) and the pick-up current values
given by [44]. The optimization algorithm uses these values to determine the optimal parameters
α, n, and TDS, which yield the minimum operation time of the PR- and BR-based smart sensors.
Table 5 lists the optimal α, n, and TDS values for the pair of relay-based smart sensors of the
faulted Zone 2 (S_1, S_2 in Scenario B) given by the execution of the GA in the APS.
• After calculation of the optimal setting parameters of the relay-based smart sensors by the APS,
the smart sensors compute the activation time of the actuator in charge of opening and clearing
this faulted zone. According to S_1 and S_2′s setting parameters in Table 5, the primary (S_2) and
backup (S_1) tripping times are 0.1 and 0.29 s, respectively. The tripping time is sent via GOOSE
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messages to the network breakers associated with S_2. The network breaker associated with S_1
only acts if Network Breaker 2 fails to isolate the faulted zone.
Table 5. APS optimal settings for S_1 and S_2 (Scenario B).
α n TDS
S_1 0.33 0.33 0.36
S_2 2 0.14 0.025
5.3. Comparison with Analogue Electromechanical Relays and IEDs
To demonstrate the network reliability improvement by the smart sensors, the tripping times of
three protection methods are compared: the classic coordination, a linear programming coordination,
and the proposed optimal smart-sensor approach. The protective devices are electromechanical relays
(ERs) when the classical protection schemes are implemented, IEDs in case of the linear programming
function, and relay-based smart sensors (S_1 and S_2) for the proposed optimal approach. In all cases,
fault Scenario B is considered (three-phase fault in Z2).
Figure 8 depicts the activation times for the three protection schemes. In Figure 8,
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• the red dots indicate the tripping times of ER1 and ER2 when the classical tripping function is
considered according to IEC standard 60255-151 [23,24];
• the green dots indicate the tripping times for IED1 and IED2 when the linear programming
technique is implemented [40]; and
• the blue dots indicate the optimal tripping time establi hed by th sma t-sensor optimal APS
coordination (S_1 and S_2).
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As illustrated in Figure 8, the APS formulation proposed in this paper, hosted in the smart sensors’
MPU, is able to reduce the fault activation time (tripping time) compared to classical electromechanical
relays and IEDs with linear protection schemes by up to 80% and 64%, respectively. One of the
advantages of the genetic algorithm is that it allows us to calculate the opening orders of network
breakers with the minimum time. As illustrated in Figure 8, the opening orders of network breakers
for the PR and BR are 0.1 s and 0.29 s, respectively. These times increase for the linear optimization
(IEDs), up to 0.28 s for the PR and 2.2 s for the BR. In the case of the classic coordination with ER,
the opening order of PR is 1.46 s, and 2.189 s for the BR. It can be deduced that the GA is the only
algorithm that is able to reduce the tripping times of the PR and BR and consequently, the opening
order of the breaker in the faulted section. Compared with other optimization functions, the proposed
smart sensor coordination establishes a tripping time lower than that proposed in [55] which ranges
from (0.21–0.27) s for the primary relay and from (0.5–0.75) s for the backup relay.
The genetic algorithm was programmed in Matlab® [56] on a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5-5200 with
8 GB of RAM. The average computation time used for optimizing the tripping time of both sensors
(S_1, S_2) was 0.7 s, which is lower than the 2 min detailed in [57].
IEC 61850-5 states that the transfer time of GOOSE messaging for a Trip command shall be such
that the command should arrive at the destination device within 3 ms [58]; consequently, the effective
communication between the PR and BR is less than 3 ms. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 8,
the opening orders of network breakers for the PR and BR are 0.1 s and 0.29 s, respectively. It has to
be noted that the PR is located next to the breaker actuator. Once the breaker receives the opening
order it will need an average time of 48 ms [59] to disconnect the faulted zone. It can be deduced
that the relation between the time of effective communication between the sensors and the time of
disconnection of the short circuit in the network is inferior to 1% for Scenario B.
5.4. Influence of Different Fault Types and Fault Locations
The proposed smart-sensor optimal protection coordination is now examined for different
fault conditions:
- Fault type: a three-phase fault (Scenarios A and C) and a single-phase-to-ground fault (Scenarios
D and E).
- Fault location: a fault in Zone 2 of the main feeder (Scenario E) and a fault in Zone 7 corresponding
to Lateral 5 (Scenario F).
- Operation conditions: one or two DG units in operation in the smart grid. In both cases, the DG
penetration level is 50%.
Figure 9 illustrates, for the main feeder fault scenarios (A, C, D and E), the optimal settings of
parameters α, n, and TDS for the backup smart sensor for the coordination of three different protective
devices: an ER with IEC overcurrent protection curves (classic) [24], an IED with the adjustment of
setting parameters by linear programming (lineal) [40], and smart sensors with optimal protection
settings given by the APS of the primary smart sensor and setting parameter communication via
GOOSE messages. As can be seen from Figure 9, the smart sensor is the only protection device capable
of adapting the setting values of the backup smart sensor for different fault types. In the case of
the primary smart sensor and for Scenarios A, C, D, and E, the primary smart sensor’s APS sets the
parameters of the primary smart sensor to α = 0.02, n = 0.14, and TDS = 0.16. These optimum settings
correspond to an operating tripping time less than 0.1 s for the primary smart sensor.
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The results of the operating times obtained by the three compared coordination methods (classical,
linear programming, and APS) for the main feeder faults as well as the lateral fault (Scenarios A,
C, D, E, and F) are presented in Table 6. As observed, the values established by the APS hosted
in the smart sensors’ MPU are substantially lower than those established by classical and linear
coordination methods.
Table 6. Comparison of operating times (classical, linear programming, and smart-sensor APS
coordination) for different fault types and locations.
Scenario
T[s] (Classical) T[s] (Linear) T[s] (APS)
S_1 S_2 S_1 S_2 S_1 S_2
A 2.99 0.2 4.1 0.26 0.39 0.1
C 2.71 0.2 2.6 0.27 0.287 0.1
D 0.76 0.31 1.17 0.26 0.32 0.1
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5.5. Influence of DG Penetration Levels
To validate the s art-s nsor protection coordination proposed in this paper under different
network situation , two important situations are studied: (i) th influence of DG penetr tion levels
and (ii) the influence f the impedanc fault values. High impedance faults in distribution networks
produce low-magnitude fault curre ts that could be considered as normal current values corresponding
to normal operations.
A study to ascertain the impact of th PV penetration level as well as fault impedance
on the protection coordination was performed for Scenario E (Table 2), rresponding to
a single-phase-to-ground fault in the main feeder (line 6–7). In Scenario E, different fault resistance
values of 0 Ω, 10 Ω, 20 Ω, and 30 Ω wer considered. Mo eover, both DG units presented in
the smart grid (Figure 7) were in oper tion, and two different penetration levels were as ssed:
17% (E17) and 50% (E50). Table 7 presents the operation time of the proposed smart-sensor protection
coordination compared with the esults obtained by classical coordin ti techniqu s with ER and
linear programing-based tec niques with IEDs. In all situations, the proposed APS run ing in the
smart sensors’ MPU provides optim l setting parameters that reduce the tripping time of t s art
sensors, as seen in Figure 10. Note that th proposed smart-sensor protection coordi ation changes
the setting of the primary and backup sm rt sensors for any variation in the DG pe etration or fault
resistance value.
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Table 7. Operation time comparison (classic, linear programming, and smart-sensor APS coordination)
for different DG penetration levels: Scenario E.
T[s] E17 T[s] E50
Classical Linear APS Classical Linear APS
R = 0 [Ω] S_1 0.7 1.09 0.3 0.75 1.1 0.29
S_2 0.31 0.26 0.1 0.32 0.27 0.1
R = 10 [Ω] S_1 2.13 2.32 0.3 - - 0.29
S_2 0.73 0.6 0.1 0.77 0.64 0.1
R = 20 [Ω] S_1 - - 0.29 - - 0.31
S_2 - - 0.1 - - 0.1
R = 30 [Ω] S_1 - - 0.32 - - 0.34
S_2 - - 0.1 - - 0.1
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It must be highlighted that when the fault resistance and the DG penetration level increase,
the classical (electromechanical relays) and linear schemes (IEDs) fail to isolate the fault. Furthermore,
for the 50% DG penetration level and single-phase-to-ground fault with a fault resistance greater
than zero, the smart-sensor protection coordination is the only scheme capable of protecting the
network—by adapting the protection setting parameters to obtain a fast response—and maintaining
the selectivity, as can be seen in Table 7.
6. Conclusions
The integration of distributed generation into smart grids could cause malfunctioning of the
protection schemes, mainly because of the bidirectional power flows and their contribution to fault
currents. With the aim of improving the reliability of smart grids, new protective devices and protection
schemes must be developed to deal with the renewable energy impact on fault currents. The ability
of smart sensors to acquire, monitor, and process measured data, as well as to execute optimization
algorithms in their MPU, plays a vital role in smart grid protection. Incorporating smart sensors into
the protection schemes reduces the activation time of network breakers and thus improves smart
grid reliability.
In this paper, a relay-based smart sensor is proposed that offers the capability of updating its
adjustment settings in real time in coordination with the BR. The protection scheme is able to optimize
the setting parameters of the smart sensors for different network operation conditions. It employs
three setting parameters (α, n, and TDS) in the optimization process, so that the operating area of the
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relay-based smart sensor is expanded, compared with the time-current curves defined by IEC 60255-151.
The communication of the proposed smart-sensor protection coordination scheme can be implemented
in a smart grid by using the communication standard IEC61850, so that smart sensors’ protection
setting parameters as well as network breaker opening signals are exchanged via GOOSE messages.
The proposed relay-based smart sensor and the protection scheme were applied to a smart
grid with DGs. The performance of the smart-sensor protection scheme was tested for different DG
penetration levels, fault types (single-phase-to-ground and three-phase faults), and faulted zones
(faults in the main feeder and in the laterals). In all cases, the APS hosted in the smart sensors’ MPU
was capable of adapting, in real time, the performance parameters of the smart sensors responsible for
protecting the faulted zone according to the operating conditions of the smart grid at the time of the
fault measured by the smart sensors. Moreover, the adaptive smart-sensor protection coordination
scheme proposed in this paper reduced the activation time of the network breakers by more than 80%
and 64% compared with analogue electromechanical relays (classical coordination) and IEDs (linear
programming), respectively. This ultimately translates into a more reliable network operation in the
presence of DGs. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the relay-based smart sensor proposed
in this paper is the only option that is able to clear the faulted zone of a smart grid with DGs when
subjected to high impedance fault conditions. In this paper, it has been shown that information and
communication technologies (ICT) play a vital role in smart grids where the IEC 61850 standard has
started to be used for smart grid protection. One of the more important challenges is to integrate
wireless communication into smart grid devices interconnecting an increasing number of smart grid
sensors in the IoT world. In the future, the proposed smart sensor will be based on IoT-IEC 61850
communication offering wireless peer-to-peer communication between relay-based sensors (PR, BR)
by means of GOOSE messages improving the communication among all the smart sensors spread over
the grid.
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Abbreviations
APS adaptive protection scheme
BR backup relay




GOOSE generic object-oriented substation event
IED intelligent electronic devices
MINLP mixed-integer nonlinear programming
MPU microprocessor unit
PMU phase measurement units
PR primary relay
PSM plug setting multiplier
PV photovoltaic
Tr smart sensor operating time
TDS time-dial setting
S_i ith smart sensor
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